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CHAPTER I
THE BANK CAPITAL PROBLEM

In recent years the problem of commercial bank capital adequacy
has received renewed attention from bank analysts.

Mayne has shown

that supervisory attempts to influence capital levels are net always
effective and that many banks have continuously resisted examiner per.
.
suas1on
to ra1se
more

.

cap~ta

1.1

ew dimensions have also been added

to the problem by the rapid expansion of bank holding companies and
by the increased willingness of management to inject long-term debt
into the capital structure of many banks.

Watson has noted several

additional reasons why capital adequacy has become a factor of increase d concern.

2

First,. the loan to deposit ratios of commercial

banks have become significantly higher than they were a few years ago.
Second

there has been a decline in the percentage of total assets

made up by investment portfolios and banks have also pledged a substantial portion of their securities portfolio to secure public deposits.
The pledging requirement prohibits the sale of securities to meet loan
demands or deposit withdrawals; therefore, these pledged assets are no
longer available as a source of liquidity.

Third, the subordinated

1
Lucille S. Mayne, "How Federal Bank Supervisors Affect Bank
Capital," Banking 6 (December 1973): 36.

2Justin T. Watson, "'A Regulatory View of Capital Adequacy,u
Journal of Bank Research 6 (Autumn 1975): 170.
1

2

debenture cannot perform the same functions as equity and is thus considered by many to be a lower quality capital.

Finally, in many

instances there has been excessive use of purchased funds to support
banking operations.

In order to examine the impact of recent banking trends on
capital adequacy, it is appropriate to first identify the intended
functions of bank capital.

The functions or purposes of bank capital

which are generally agreed upon are the following: (1) to acquire the
necessary fixe d assets of the banking business (e.g., building,
mach~nery,

and equipment), (2) to absorb losses and to protect the

depositors if the bank is closed,, (3) to support credit risks; both
federal and State of Florida regulations limit loans and lines of
credit based on a percentage of a bank's capital, (4) capital stock
is the represe tation of private ownership.

Crosse and Henpel have

stated that the primary function of capital is "to reassure the public
and especially bank supervisors that the bank is in a position to withstand whatever strains may be placed on it.

Adequate capital serves

to keep banks open so that they may be able to absorb losses out of
future earnings rather than out of capital funds themselves."

1

From examination of the historical record it is evident that
bankers have heen· gradually decreasing capital levels of their banks.
Regulators have probably tended to be conservative in setting appropriate capital adequacy standards and bank management has attempted

~oward D. Crosse and George H. Hempel, Management Policies for
Connnercial Banks (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973),
p. 71.

3

to boost profits by reducing equity capital.

Bank examiners would

probably be more comfortable with excess levels of capital since they
are concerned with the safety of the industry and bank failure draws
criticism of the regulatory agency from the public.

However, bank

profits result from the differential between lending and borrowing
rates and the lower the capital-asset ratio, the lower this differential need be in order to achieve a normal return on equity capital.
The furt er bankers can permit capital-asset ratios to dwindle,
driving up profitability, the happier the stockholders will be provided they aren't disturbed by the increased risk.
The primary objecti e of bank regulation is the prevention of
bank failure.

One of the most important indicators of a bank's

financial condition to the regulatory authority is capital adequacy;
it occupies their greatest effort in the supervisory process.

1

How-

ever, since the deposits of most individuals are insured by the Federal
Dep,o sit Insurance Corporation, small depositors need not concern themselves lvith the problems of capital adequacy..

Capital levels are of no

concern as long as deposits are insured and therefore, only companies
with large uninsured deposits may be concerned about bank capital.

But

if bank failures occur due to inadequate levels of capital then public
confidence in the commercial banking system may suffer and society as a
whole will be penalized.

Commercial banks are the primary legal money

creating institutions in the economy, they provide a major portion of
1Thomas G. Gies and Vincent R. Apilado, "Capital Adequacy and
Commercial Bank Failure," Bankers Magazine 155 (Summer 1972): 24.
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TABLE 1
STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FLORIDA

(In Thousand of Dollars)
TOTAL

YEAR

NUMBER
OF BANKS

TOTAL
ASSETS

CAPITAL
ACCOUNTS

TOTAL CAPITAL
TOTAL ASSETS

TOTAL

(IN PERCENT)

DEPOSITS
$

974

666

39

4,510

1~006

22

3,408

41

14,,338

3,222

22

10,291

1910

113

27,599

5,607

20

2t)' 884

1915

192

42,656

9,811

23

30,527

1920

212

114,374

13,272

12

95,349

1925

271

539,101

33,427

6

50.1,553

1930

151

92,928

16,422

18

70,235

1935

102

64,276

9,768

15

53,552

1940

14

116,169

14,233

12

101,545

1945

12

450,838

20,135

4

430,256

1950

130

619,,824

37,603

6

580,607

1955

146

1,138,114

67,726

6

1,064,763

1960

181

1,781,837

139,368

8

1,620,185

1965

239

2 571,685

216,444

8

2,310,384

1970

282

5,,603,445

425,9 45

8

4,996,082

1975

449

11,757,147

989,185

8

10,346 ,695

1976

448

12,662,068

1,053,064

8

11,417,766

1895

21

1900

22

1905

SOURCE·

$

1,692

$

Data adapted from Florida, Office of Comptroller,
Annual Report of the Division of Banking (Tallahassee,
1976), p. 9.
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the investment funds acquired by the economy and they also have
primary responsibility for effecting an efficient payments

m~echanism.

If the public felt that its deposits were vulnerable to loss, many
depositors would want to hold their wealth in the form of currency.

Banks would then be denied a most important source of funds and the
economy would be denied bank services which are vital to modern
business trade.

This is the reason bank capital levels should concern

the general public as well as bankers and why supervisory authorities
a ttempt to identify banks with inadequate capital.
The following statement is a pre' cis of the bank capital problem:
The

problem has become confused with the question
of bank liquid~ty. Indeed, it sometimes appears that capital is regarded as something held in the bank to meet the demands of depositors.
othing could be furthe from the truth. The main issue in connection
ith bank capital transcending such peripheral problems as the correct
ratio or the character of bank assets, is whether or not we are sufficien ly concerned about preserving the present unit system of privately
owned banks. Serio s quest1.ons are bound to be raised when the legal
owners of a bank permit their equity in the enterprise to shrink so
drastical y that they have little stake in sound banking. They have
degeneratea to the level of self-appointed allocators of a large and
v ·tal segment of the nation's resources. If the enterprise happens to
be profitab 'e, the returns to the bankers in these situations are undeservedly large. If on the other hand, losses are incurred they are
limited to the amount of a small investment. To stretch the situation
to, but not beyond, the breaking point appears to be the fond hope of
bank owners who are disposed to view with complacency the decline in
the capital ratio. Continuance of this situation is bound to breed
suggestions that dilution of the private equity in banks has reached a
point requiring the management of banking be socialized. They (the
bankers) must realize that the erosion of capital may unwittingly cause
them to lose control of their banking establishments. 1
capital~zation

1E. H. Cramer "The Philosophy of Bank Capitalization," Journal
of Finance 6 (March 1951): 62-65, quoted in Basil J. Moore, An
Introduction to the Theory of Finance (Free Press: New York, 1968),
p. 213.

CHAPTER II

LAWS GOVERNING BANK CAPITAL

Minimum amounts of capital are specified and required under
Florida law for the establishment of a state chartered bank.

Origi-

nally, minimum amounts of capital were designed to provide the necessary levels for adequate assur3nce of safe banking practice, but as the
banking system developed in this country,. the size of the deposits in
individual banks expanded, a larger proportion of earning assets were
made up of loans

and the legally defined minimum amount of capital

became less of an assurance of capital adequacy.

Crosse and Henpel

tate that these legal requirements have little real significance for

bank·ng or bank regulation today.

They explain that most state laws

'w re e acted at a time when banks were much smaller.

They have not

been revised upward largely because the determination of capital
adequacy has, in fact ., become a matter of administrative judgement
rather than definitive law."

1

Florida law stipulates minimum levels of capital stock for state
chartered banks based upon the population of the community in which
the bank will b

located:

The cap·tal stock of a state bank or trust company shall be in
such amounts as the department (State Department of Banking) shall
1Howard D. Crosse and George H. Hempel, Management Policies for
Commercial Banks (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), P· 74.
6

7

de·em adequate,, but not less than the following aggregate amounts,
based upon the population of the community in which the bank or
trust company will be locat.e d according to the latest official
census:
(a , Twenty-five thousand dollars if the population of the community
in which the bank or trust company will he located does not
~exceed five thousand and fifty thousand dollars if the population of the community in whieh the bank will be loeated does
not exceed ten thousand •.
(b) One hundred thousand dollars if the population of th ~e community
in which the bank or trust company will be located exceeds ten
thousand, but does, not exceed fifty thousand.
(c) Two hundred thousand dollars if the population •.. exceeds fifty
thousand.
(d) Three hundred thousand doll ars if the population .. .• exceeds two
hundred thousand.!
The Florida Banking Code also limits the ability of state
chartered banks to make changes in capital:
o state bank or trust company shall reduce its outstanding capital
stock without first obtaining the consent of the Commi~sion (State
Co~ssioner of Banking) 2
Legal provisions for membership in the Federal Reserve Syst.em
specify capital requirements with broader implications than the capital
provisions for state chartering.

The United States Code, conc,e rning

capital stock required as a condition precedent to membership,
provides.
No applying bank shall be admitted to membership unless it
possesses capital stock and surplus which, in the judgement of the
Board of Governors of the F'e deral Reserve System, are adequate in
relation to the character and condition of its assets .and to its
existing and pros:pective deposit liabilities and other corporate
responsibilities"' Provided, that no bank engaged in the business
of receiving deposits othe.r than trust funds., which do ,e s not
possess capital stock and surplus in amount equal to that which
would be required for the establishment of a national banking
.
association in the places in which it is located, shall be admitted

1Banking Code.

2

Florida Statutes, Vol. 2, Chapter 659.04.

Ibid ., Chapter 659.10.

8
to membership unl ~ess it is, or has been approved for d,e posit
insurance under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The capital
stock of a state membe.r b .a nk shall n~ot be reduced except with

the prior consent of the Board.l
Membership in the Federal Reserve System gives the agency supervisory authority and responsibility for determing capital adequacy
under Regulation H of the Board of Governors:
If at any time, in the lJ.ght of all the circumstances,. the
aggregate amount of a member stat.e bank's net capital and

surplus funds appears to be inadequate, the bank, within such
period as shall be deemed by the Board to be reasonable for
this purpose, shall increase the amount thereof to an amount
which in the judgement of the Board shall be adequate in
relation to the character and condition of its assets and to
J..ts deposit liabil1ties and other corporate responsibilities. 2

The application of nonmember banks for insured status under the

Federal Deposit Insurance Act prov'ides that "any state nonmember bank,
upon appl cation to and examination by the corporation and approval by
the Board of

Dire~ctors,

may become an

insur~ed bank. 113

In approving

the application of any state nonmember bank the following factors shall
be given consideration:
The financial history and condition of the bank ., the adequacy of
its capital structur ~e, its future earnings prospects, the general
character of its. management, the convenience and needs of the
c ~ommunity to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corpora.t~e powers ar·e consistent with the purposes of this chapter. 4
A further provis,1on concerning capital under the Insurance Act

1

Banks and Banking.

2

.3

conditions. o,f

M~embership,

B.anks and Banking.

4

U.S. Code, Title 12, Sec. 329.

Banks and Banking.

12 C. F .R . 208.7 (1952) .

u.s.

Code, Title 12, Sec. 1815.

u.s.,

Code~

Title l?_, Sec. 1816 .

9
No insured state nonmember bank shall, without prior consent of
the Corporation, reduce the amount or retire any part of its common or p~ referred capital stock, or retire any part of its capital
notes
debentures.l

or

1

Ibid., sec. 1838.

CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE BANK HOLDING COMP'ANY

Early history in American banking was a time when branching was
considered a normal means of providing bank services to a community.
Branch banking in Florida was first authorized in 1889 but the Act of
1913 abolished branches and prohibited the establishment of a bank or
trust company without the authorization of the State Comptroller.

In

the late 1800's branching by national banks was prohibited and many
other states either lilrited or

prohibit ~ed

branching.

Many banks were

then faced with the difficulty of finding a means through which to
grow and expand, the means became the common ownership of independent
banks.

Early

cl~evelopments

therefor~e,

provided a

prec ~edent

for the

formation of multi-bank holding companies.
A bank holding company is defined as any corporation, partnership, association or similar organization which directly or indirectly
owns , 1 eontrols, or has, power to vote 25 per eentum of voting securities
of a bank.

1

The eorporation owns the controlling stock in the constit-

uent bank and provides managerial services to the bank in an attempt

to improve its performance.
its

~ own

charter,

o~ fficers,

do independent banks.
1

A holding company aff1.liated bank retains
board of directors and capital structure as

Although bank affiliates of the holding company

Banks and Banking .

U.. S. Code, Title 12, sec . 1841.

10

11

are managed by their own d1.rectors and offic,e rs, the parent company

provides supervision and assistance concerning

op ~erating

policy..

Hold-

ing comp_anies differ from individual banks in that they do not fall
under the general banking laws of the states or the nation, however
every bank whether affiliated or independent is subject to the laws,

under which it was organized and chartered.

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was the first effort by
Congress to' control the multi-unit banking movement.

Act each bank holding

~co~ mpany

Under the 1'956

was required to register with the Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System information concerning:
financial condit -·on and operations, management and intercompany rela.
h
t~ons

also

1
.
.
.
.
.
1ps
o f . th e parent assoc1at1an
an d 1. t s s ub s1., d 1ar1es.

c ~ontain.ed

The Act

a blanket prohibit· on concerning holding eompany

int ~er ~est

in. nonbank.ing organizations,, it stat,e d that no bank holding company

shall acquire d"rect or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company wh1ch is not a bank.
r ~equired

ownership

2

Approval of the Board was

before any holding company could acquire direct or indirect
o~ r

control any voting shares of any bank if, after such

acquisition, such company would directly or indirectly own or control
mor~e

. 3

than five per centum of the voting shares of such bank.

In

every case the Board was instructed to take into consideration the

1Bank s and- Banking.
2
3

Ibid., sec. 1843.

Ibid., se,c. 1842.

U.~.

Code, Title 12, sec. 1844.

12

following factors for determination of application for approval: 4
(1) financial and managerial resources, (2) future prospects of the
bank coocerned, and (3) the convenience and needs of the community to
be served.
On December 31, 1970,, the B~ ank Holding Company Act of 1956 was

amended in order to include in its coverag,e holding companies controlling only one bank and t .o

p~ermit

holding organizations to enter into

nonbanking activities closely related to hanking.

The Board of

Governors was assigned the responsibility of administering the provisions of the Amendments so that all bank holding, companies would
operat ~e

under the same prohibition of their nonbanking

activiti~es.

The Board's approval is required for the establishment of a holding
company operation and the Hoard now also has the responsibility to
det ~ermine

tie.s

the extent of participation of holding companies in activi-

clos ~ely

related to banking.

In determining whether a particular

activity is a proper i.ncident to banking or controlling banks the
Board was directed, by the Amendment, to consider whether its pe.rformance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected
to produce benefit.s to the public, such as greater convenience,

increased competition, or gains in
adverse

efficiency~

that outweigh possible

ffects such as undue c~oncentra.tion of resources, decrease.d or

unfair competition

conflict of interest, or unsound banking practices.

Therefore, today holding enterprises are permitted to own shares in
1

- Ibid., sec. 1842.

2Banks and Banking.

U.S. Code, Title 12, sec. 1843.

2

13

companies whose activities are either closely related to bankings'
functions of holding deposits and lending money or are part of operat-

ing a bank .

1

The effect of the 1970 Amendment was to open the door for both
multi- and one-bank organization to engage in a broader range of
activ1ties.

Although heightened competition, potential economies of

organization and an improved quality of management are often cited as
the motives for the liberalized policy, damage to the welfare of the
public (e.g

a reduced competitive environment) is possible as a

res lt of concentrat1ng bank resources in a small group of holding
co panies .

A bill now in Congressional Committee, the "Competition

in Banking Act of 1977," would prohibit bank mergers or acquisitions
if t e parent bank or holding company would thereafter control more
than 20 percent of the banking assets in a particular state except
where essentia

to prevent a bank failure and where no feasible, less

anticompetitive, alternative solution were available.

2

The Bill

"tself implies that the present explosive growth of bank holding
companies is unfavorable and proposes to limit acquisitions on the
basis of statewide concentration

1

see Table 1 for a summary of activities approved and denied by
the Board.
2 George

. Le Maistre, "Competition in Banking Act of 1977",
Florida Banker, April 1978, p. 18.
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TABLE 1
BANK HOLDING COMPANY

Activiti-es APPROVED by the Board
of Governors

Activities DENIED by the Board
of Governors

1..

1.

2

Dealer in bankers' acceptances,

Equity funding (combined

sale of mutual funds and

ortgage company

insuranc ~e)

3•

Finance

4.

Credit card company

5.

Factoring company

3.

Real estate brokerage

6.

Op

4.

Land development

7.

Servic~ng

5.

Real estate syndication

8

Tr st company

6.

9

Ad iser to Real Estates investme t trusts and other investment
companies

General management consulting

7.

Property management

c ~ompany

2.

ating an industrial bank
loans

10.

Genera , economic information
an advice

11 .

Portfolio investment advice

12.

Full pay-out leasing of personal
property

13 .

' ull pay out leasing of real
pr p ~erty

14 .

Community welfare investments

15 .

Bookkeeping and data processing
services

16.

Insurance ag,e nt or broker in
connecti,o n with credit extensions

17.

Underwriting credit life and
c edit

ac ~ciden t

and health

insurance
18

Courier service

19.

Management consulting to nonaffiliated banks

20.

Sale of travelers checks

21.

Bullion broker

Underwriting general life

insurance

15
TABLE 2
FLORIDA MUL,TI-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

LISTED IN ORDER OF COMBINED DEPOSITS
DECEMBER 31, 1976
(Millions)

1

Southeast Banking Corp.

2.

Barnett Banks of

Fl~orida,

Inc.

15.

Sun Banks of Florida, Inc.
Flagship Banks, Inc.
Florida ational Banks
Atlant1c Bancorporation
F~rst Florida Banks
Landmark Banking
Ellis Bankiug Corp.
Century Banks, Inc.
Pan American Bancshares
Exchange Bancorporation
First Bancshares of Florida
City ational Bank Gorp.
Southwest Florida Banks, Inc.

16.

First ifarine Banks

17

21.

Florida Commerical Banks
First State Banking Corp.
American Bancshares, Inc.
F rst Bankers Corp.
Communit Banks of Florida

3
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9 ,,
10.
11.
12.
13.
14..

~ 8.

19.
20

No. of
Banks
12/31/76

Combined

0/0 of

Dep,o sits

State

12/31/76

Total

47

$,2' 748

10.3

60
39
,42
3·2

2,176
1,613
1,457
1,408
1,204
1,140

8.1

31
1'9
17

25

858

785

16

704

14
14
14
7

658

9
9
7
6
9

7
8
4

645
528
493

41'9

332
331
296

6.0
5.4
5.2
4.5

4. 2
3.2
2.9
2.6
2.4
2.4
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.2

194
176
175
157
142
136

1.2
1.1
1.0
.9
.7
.6
.6
.5
.5
.5

.4
.4

283

263

22 .,

Popular Baneshares

23
24.
25.
26.

Florida Bancshares, Inc .
Florida Coast Banks, Inc.
Combanks Corporation
American Banks of Florida, Inc ..

'4

27..

Cent-ral Bancorp. ,, Inc.

2

28.
29.

Jefferson Bancorp.
Royal Trust Company
North Florida Bancshares ,, Inc.
Florida Shares, Inc.

3

111
109

3
2
2

137
86
39

.5
.3
.1

470

19,803

72.9

30.

31.

TOTAL
SOURCE:

6
5

7

Allen C. Ewing and Co., Florida Bank Holding Companies
(Jacksonville,. Florida: Allen C. Ewing and Co., 1977),
p. 4.

CHAPTER IV

RISK AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The riskiness of a business can be defined in terms of the relative

ariability of net operating income..

When considering the riski-

ess of a particular firm it is important to consider that company's
level of diversification, since the diversified firm may be expected
to exp rie c.e more stable profits than would its subdivisions operating
along.

The possibility of such risk reduction is one of the main

motivating factors fundamental to corporate diversification.

1

A

hold.ng company can diversify its operation, that is, a holding company

may engage in other businesses in addition to commercial banking.

If

these companies have less than perfect positive correlation of returns,
th

operating risk of the holding company is reduced relative to bank-

ing alone.

The relevant question then becomes:

Do bank holding

companies der1ve sufficient benefits from diversification into related
fields to reduce the lev,e l of risk in affiliated banks, or does holding
company affiliation increase exposure.?
Because banks function under the supervision of regulatory
agencies

their operation is held to be generally less risky than

related nonbanking operations..

Since consumer finance companies lend

1James R. McGuigan and R. Charles Moyer, Managerial Economics:
Private and Public Sector Decision Analysis (Hinsdale: Dryden Press,
1975), p. 455.
16

17
to customers who are higher credit risks, the lending of these institutions have a higher risk of default.

This points out that bankholding

company qperations may be subjected to greater operating risk than
banking along; however, the ability of holding companies to diversify
and hold a portfolio of earning assets may reduce variability in their
earnings.

Since each industry has its own characteristic cyclical

pattern, a diversified firm may expect its earnings to be more stable

than if it e11gaged exclusively in one specific operation.
In the case of a bank holding company, diversification consists
of combining activities with less than perfect positive correlation
in order to reduce risk.
a~tiv.ties

enterp~ rises

t

e

The expected return of the consolidated

is the weighted average of the expected return of the
co prising the holding company.

The expected return of

olding company may be calculated with the following equation:

n
E(x)

= l:

xiRi

i=l
whe e,

E(x) = expected return of the holding company.
xi

=

percent of total holding company assets
represented by firm i.

Ri

= expected return from firm i.

The variance of the holding company's return can be expressed:

n
Var(rh) == L
i=l

where

n
E
Xi Xj Pij Gi Gj
j =l

18
Var(Ib) - variance in holding company return.
xi = participation level or proportion of
total holding company assets represented
by firm i.
xj = participation level or proportion of

total holding company assets represented
by firm j .
pij = correlation coefficient between firm i

and firm j .
6i = standard deviation of return from firm i.
6j =standard deviation of return from firm j.

The variability in returns to holding companies depends therefore
upon the standard deviation of returns and the participation level

represente

by each subsidiary.

The correlation between subsidiary

ct"viti s also plays an important role in reducing risk; the lower the
oef

cient of correlation, the better the risks offset each other and

the smaller

he risk inherent in the consolidated firm.

1

The primary objective of financial management should be to maximize the wealth of the firms common shareholders or maximize the value
of the owners' interest in the firm.

The financial manager affects the

value of a corporation's stock by controlling the level of risk inherent in the firm and by influencing the determinants of profitability.

Both the riskiness and the profitability of the company are

determined by the company's liquidity position and the proportion of
1

For a more indepth treatment of portfolio risk and diversification see Tack C. Francis and Stephen H. Archer, Portfolio Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs:. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971) .
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debt employed.

The price of connnon stock is a function of the share-

holder's risk preferences and his expectations of earnings from the
firm's operation .

Risk is the probability that a given return will be

lower than the anticipated return; the tighter the probability distribution of expected future returns, the smaller the risk of a particular
investment.

If the investor is to tolerate additional risk,

incr ~easingly

higher expected returns on investments are required to

compensate the investor.

The basis of this risk aversion is the

principle of diminishing marginal utility of income.
bus ness firm employs financial leverage when it issues debt or

aps an outside source of funds for which it pays a specific fixed
charge.

Financial leverage causes earnings per share to change by a

greater percentage than changes in its earnings before interest and
ta es (EBIT).

When the return on assets increases, the return to the

common shareholders increase more than proportionately, leverage is
said to be favo able and when the return from assets declines, earnings
per share

ill dec ease more than proportionately; thus, leverage is

unfavorable.

The greater the proportion of debt in the capital

structure of a bank or a holding company, the greater the rate of return to common shareholders providing that EBIT exceeds total interest
payments.
Financial leverage magnifies the fluctuations in earnings available to common equity.

With the employment of debt a bank automati-

cally assumes a higher level of risk exposure, because of the greater
dispersion of possible returns.

Debt commits the bank to a fixed

interest obligati,on that must be paid, re.gardless of the level of
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earnings and as debt comes due, cash is required to repay the debt.
Higher amounts of debt increase the variability of earnings and the
risk of bankruptcy.

The greater the dependence upon debt in the

capital structure, the wider the dispersion in possible earnings per

sha e , and the greater the risk of cash insolvency.
Holding companies disguise the risk involved in the financial
1 veragi g of banks through a process known as double leveraging.

A

holdi g company can sell a debenture or debt instrument, then use the
proceeds to make equity investments and acquire subsidiaries.

If a

agency requests an affiliated bank to increment their

re ulato

equ"ty capi al

the parent company can simply borrow to meet the

equest and use the borrowed funds to purchase new shares of common
1
'
.
b ank .
stoc k 1ss
e db y t h e respect1ve

In the process the bank adds to

"ts equity capital and at present appears to be safer; however, the
o ding compan

ill now require dividends from the subsidiary in
It is not difficult to imagine a situation

order to service the deb

in which hold1.ng company policies might conflict tvith the safe opera-

t •on o

a subsidiary bank.

Business r1sk may be defined as the dispersion in possible
f uture returns, whereas financial risk denotes the dispersion in
r tu ns available to common equity which is a result of the firm's
. 1 ar ca 1ta
. 1
part1cu

in a firm is increased
1

2

structure. ~

When the amount of leverage employed

the financial risk to which the common

For an accounting illustration of double leveraging see

appendix A
2

cGuigan and Moyer, Managerial Economics, p. 376-77.
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shareholder is exposed is also increased.

The level of financial risk

utilized in the capital structure should be inversely related to the
level of business risk inherent in the concern.

The degree of

financial leverage that a holding company or an individual bank can
tolerate without threatening the safety of the bank is dependent upon
the level of business risk .

If bank holding companies are able to

reduce the business risk of their operations through efficient diversif~cation

en

risk

r

then the holding company is strengthened as Jell as the

banking system .

In general, the higher the level of business

the lower should be the level of financial risk, all other

factors held constant.

CHAPTER V
CAPITAL ALTERNATIVES
What alternative means does an established commercial bank in
Florida have for incrementing its capital account?

The most obvious

method is to simply sell additional shares of common stock, either to
e ·sting owners or solicit new shareholders.

If the new issue is sold

above par value, the bank increments both its common stock and its
surplus account

The retention of all or some portion of after-tax

earn ·ngs nll increase the equity capit.a l account and the bank can

alter its retention policy to help meet the need for capital growth.
If a bank's propert- at book value is less than actual market value,

a

be adventageous for the bank to arrange a sale and leaseback

of 1.t

eal estate .

When the sale price of assets is greater than

the book value of these assets, the bank will add to its surplus
account.

Through this arrangement capital frozen in fixed assets can

be converted to a liquid form that can support an expansion of loans

and investments.

Another method available to a state bank for raising

additional capital is the issuance of preferred stock.

Preferred

stock is an equity and represents a permanent source of funds;
accordingly, failure to make dividend payments does not threaten the
solvency of the bank.
deductable; that is

Unfortunately preferred dividends are not tax
earnings available to common stockholders are
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first reduced by the full amount of the payment to preferred.

Finally,

if supervisory authorities approve, a bank can issue subordinated notes
and debentures.

Debentures are long-term debt instruments which are

not secured by a mortgage or specific property or a lein against any
bank assets

In the event of liquidation the subordinated feature

g1ves the debenture a right or claim on assets only after other indebt~edness

of the bank has been paid.

Management should select the

particular alternative or combination of alternatives based on the
cost o
f unds

alternat ·ve sotrces of funds, the anticipated return on new
present

ark,e t conditions and the bank's objectives.

The hypothetical bank in table X illustrates the effect of
ere enting capital from alternative source.

The assumptions under

h"ch this example was construc ted are as follows:

The bank currently

has four h ndred thousand shares of common stock outstanding, $20
par-value

a d $2 million in surplus, undivided profits and reserves.

fter all ope rat ng exp ,e nses but before taxes the bank earns 1. 25 percent on total asse ts, the applicable tax rate is 30 percent.
total $150 million and the total capital account is

10

bank e aminers suggest the bank increase capital b
anagement must now decide among three alternati e

Assets

i llion,
u · ion.

eans of raising

additional capital
1.

The bank may sell fifty thousan

at $40 per share, a times earnings ratio

a e

f a

2.

Sell preferred stock with a 9 per e

3.

Offe

r
t

t ~ely

1

di i e d rate

nonconvertible subordinated debentures

~v:it h

a coupon
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rate of 9 percent .

1

Following the new financing the bank has assets of $152 million and a
total capital account of $12 million.

If the financing is done with

common stock the total number of shares outstanding will increase to
450 thousand .

In table Y earnings per common share are altered through

changes in earnings on total as.sets ,. the tax rate, cost of debt and
the marke t value of common stock.
ith the aid of the following algebraic equation some general
conclusions can be drawn concerning the profitability of employing
va ious sources of

cap~tal

entirely of common equ1ty

funds .

When a bank's capital consists

we may express the return to common share-

holde s as:

n

= (R-x)(l-t)
c

where
n

=

return on common stock (profitability)

R - total operating revenue

c

=

total operating expenses

~

common equity

t = applicable tax rate
Assume that a given amount of common equity is replaced with

preferred stock, the equat ion becomes:

rr

==

(R-x)(l-t) - (Kp)(P)
c-p

1 Note that interest charges on debt securities are tax deductible, therefore the effective cost of procuring debt capital is lowered
relative to other sources any time the tax rate is greater than zero.

Earnings on Existing Assets

400,000

Number of Shares

Earnings on Increased Assets*

Preferred Dividends

Net Income after Taxes

Taxes 30% Rate

Net Income before Taxes

Less Interest

Earnings on Assets 1.25%

II.

-0-

1,443,750

618,750

2,062,500

-0-

$2,062,500

$3.28

,312,500

Net for Common Stock

Earnings per Share

-0-

1,312,500

562,500

1,875,000

-0-

$1,875,000

Present

Preferred Dividends

Net Income after Taxes

Taxes 30% Rate

Net Income before Taxes

Less Interest

Earnings on Assest 1.25%

I.

-0-

1,461,250

626,250

2,087,500

-0-

$2,087,500

$2.96

450,000

1,330,000

-0-

1,330,000

570,000

1,900,000

-0-

$1,900,000

Capital .tn
with

se

180,000

1,461,250

262,250

2,087,500

-0-

$2,087,500

$2.87

400,000

1 ,150,000

180,000

1,330,000

570,000

1,900,000

-0-

$1,900 ...000

Capital Increased
\-lith 9io
rred Stock

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE FORt-IS OF FINANCING

TABLE X

- 0-

1,335,250

572,250

1,907,500

180,000

$2,087,500

$3.01

400,000

1,204,000

-0-

1,204,000

516,000

1,720,000

180,000

$1,900,000

l/1

N

Capital Increased
with 9io
Subordinated
Debentures

Earnings. on Increased Assets*

,$ 3. 61

400,000

$1,443,750

Present

$3.25

450,000

$1,461,250

*Assume that existing assets increase by ,$ 15 million.

Earnings per Share

Number of Shares

Net for Common Stock

II.

X~ontinue

Capital Increased
with
Common Stock ($40)

TABLE

$3 .. 20

400,000

$1>281,250

Capital Increased
with 9%
Preferred Stock

$3. J ,4

400,,000

$1,335,250

Subordinated
Debentures

with 9%

cr-.

N

Capital Increased
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TABLE Y

EFFECT OF CHARGES IN BASIC VARIABLES ON
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARES

Additional Capital Financed with:
Common

Stock

Preferred
Stock

Subordinat ed
Debentures

$3.25

$3.20

$3 ..34

Earnings on Assets r1se to 2.0%
before taxes

5.20

5.39

5.53

Earnings on ssets fall to .5%
before ta es

1.30

1.01

1.15

Tax Rate is 50%

2.32

2.16

2.38

Tax Rate · s 0%

4 . 64

4.77

4.77

Cost of Debt declines to 6%

3.25

3.20

3.44

Cost of Debt

3.25

3.20

3.27

$20/share

2.92

3.20

3.34

Common Stock Price rises to
$65/share

3.39

3.20

3.34

Variable Changes*
a Change

Co

0

ris ~es

to 12%

Stock Price declines to

*Only the variable noted is permitted to change, all other
var · bles are the same as shown in table X part II.
where,

P - preferred stock
Kp

=

dividend rate of preferred

From the equation we may conclude that as long as the dividend
rate of preferred stock is less than the return on common stock,
the replacement of common with preferred will
c.
increase. the return on common stock or profitability.
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If a s pec i f ied amount of common equity is replaced by debt
capital, the equation becomes:
rr

=

(Kd) (D)] (1-t)

[(R-x )

c

whe re ,
D

=

Debt capital or subordinated debentures

Kd = coupon rate or interest

ch.arg ~es

on debt

This formula t i on differ s from p ref e rr ed stock because of the tax
advantage of debt; that is ,, t h e i nter est cost of debt is deductable

from income before taxation .

The

r eplac ~ement

of common equity with

debt capital will, the refor e, be p rofitable when ever

Kd < R-x.
c

CHAPTER VI

DEBT AS CAPITAL

When additional bank capital is required, the substituting of
debt for equity increases the risk exposure of the leveraging bank.
Risk is increased because the capital debenture cannot help insure
solvency by absorbing operational losses.

fi

In case of bankruptcy a

's losses are absorbed by both the creditors and owners of the

bus~ness

similarly, in the case of a banks failure both debt and

equ"ty capital will be expired before the F.D.I.C. or depositors are

endangered

But operatin 5 losses cannot be charged against debt except

in the case of

liquidat~on

the r sk of bank failure.

1

and therefore debt capital cannot reduce
Debt as well as equity will provide pro-

teet on to depositors when a bank is forced to close; however, when
the f ncti n of c pital is intended to be the prevention of failure
by absorbing losses, only equity accounts can be viewed as bank

cap·tal.
~hy

Considering the social cost of bank failure, it is obvious

growth in th

problem.

use of capital notes and debentures is a potential

Future increases in the utilization of debt capital by

commerical banks depends upon the characteristics which make debentur s an attractive

source of funds.

1For an illustration of how losses are absorbed by equity
capital see ppendix B.
29
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dvantages of Capital Debentures

1.

The use of the capital debenture avoids the dilution of

voting interest which will occur with the issuance of additional
connnon stock; the existing owners are not forced to share their
control when debt financing is employed.

This can be an important

consideration in the case of a closely held bank when existing stockholders do not want their voting positions compromised.

2.
sales o

Florida Banking code states that the unrepaid proceeds of
capital notes and debentures shall be considered as a part

aggregate amount of capital and surplus in computing loan and

of th

nves ment li
issu· g bank.
t

~tation

1

and in evaluating adequacy of capital of the ·

However, the Federal Reserve does not consider deben-

hen assess·ng bank capital adequacy and therefore only state-

res

chartere -

non-member banks enjoy the benefit of counting debentures

as an ·nerement to the level of capital.
3.

unds provided by capital debentures are of long maturity

and ·n rease the ability of the issuing bank to make long-term loans.
Long-term debt has a fixed maturity, therefore it does not
greatly in rease t e need for liquidity reserves.
5.

Legal reserve requirements are not applicable to debentures;

thus, t e total amount of funds generated through their sale are

usable.
6.

Proceeds from the

ale of debentures are not subject to

deposit 'nsurance costs of the Federa
1 Banking Code~

Florida Statutes

Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Vol. 2, chapter 659.23.
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If a substantial increase in the price level occurs in the

7.

future it will benefit the bank that issues debentures since the
incurred debt will ultimately be repaid with depreciated dollars.

Disadvantages of the Capital Debenture

1.

When a bank markets long-term debt they run the risk that

1.nterest rate changes may result in the securities becoming an expensive source of funds.

high with

r ~e.s pect

rates fall .

1

Fo r

The inter ,e st cost of debt sold today will be

to rates accessible at a later date of interest
~example,

assume a bank sells $25 mil lion in deben-

tures, a one percent decline in the stated interest rate would mean a
$250,000 p e- tax cost savings.

Interest rate risk is unavoidable,

but management can r eta in a call provision which will permit the debt
secur ·ties to b,e redeemed at 100% of t heir principle amount together
with accrued interest to the dat e of redemption.
ibil .. t

To maintain flex-

in the financial structure of the bank and to minimize the

r"sk of d clining interest rates, all debentures should be subject to
redemption and the timing of the iss ue must be carefully evaluated.
2.

Debt capital has, a fixed maturity and management must make

provsions for its repayment.
debentures
l ~east

.ar~e

annually

Florida law requires that if capital

not subject to obligatory prepayment of principal at
the issuing bank shall establish and maintain a suit-

able sinking fund f or the amortization of the principle at the end of
1

conversly, if 1nterest rates rise the bank has secured funds
at a relatively low price.
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the third year from the date of issue.
3.

1

Debt involves a fixed charge which implies greater risk; if

earnings fluctuate severely, the bank may not be able to meet these
fixed charges.

The larger the proportion of debt that is employed as

an alternative to equity, the greater the risk of bank failure.

If

a bank becomes excessively reliant on debt to supplement its capital
account, the risk to which depositors are exposed will increase signif · cantly.
4.

I

though the debenture can strengthen the ability of the

bank to meet customers' loan demands and to maintain deposit convertibility , liability of the
c

not help

prot ~ect

deb ~enture

is limited and therefore it

the bank from technical insolvency.

•

~anking Code. Florida Statutes, Vol. 2_, chapter 659.23.
This sink"ng fund provision does not apply to debentures which are
obligations of bank holding companies.

CHAPTER VII
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In a study published in 1975 ,, by Heggestad and Mingo, it was

hypothesized that the optimal level of capital in holding company
1

subsidary banks would be lower than for independent banks..

They

reasoned that capital would be passed to the parent organization in
the form of
oth ~er

d~vidends

since the holding company could then

inv~est

in

permissible activities, some of which are more profitable than
In addition to the profit incentive for transferring

banking.

capital out of banking subsidiaries, such movement is al,so encouraged
b

regulations

d~esigned

to protect the affiliate.d bank.

Capital held

in the subsidiary bank is subject to a series of limitations regarding
tr

sfers ·

for example, dividends to the

earnings by regulation and bank loans to

restricted in size.

par~ent

are tied to past

no~nbank

subsidiaries are

Therefore, capital held in a bank is not easily

accessed by other subsidiaries whereas capital held in the parent or
other subsidiary can be more readily transferred to the bank.

Be ~cause

the holding company may benefit by retaining its existing capital out-

s"de its bank subsidiary

t he BHC-owned bank is also more likely to

resi,s t any regulatory pressure to increase bank c.apital.
portion

The pro-

that lower capital-asset ratios should be observed for

1

Arnold A. Heggestad and John J. Mingo, ncapital Management by
Holding Company Banks,u Jounral of Business 48 (October 1975): 500.
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affiliated banks

as tested utilizing a multiple regression technique

based on models of capital investment in banking as described by Mayne
and Peltzman.

1

Data for the model was computed from a sample of the

365 largest banks in the nation; of these 248 banks were affiliated
and 117 ·ndependent, while the banks ranged in size from $120 million
to 22 billion in total deposits as of December 1972..

The empirical

evidence provided by t he study leads to the conclusion that banks'
cap

pos1tions decline when they become affiliated with holding

a

co panies .
study published in 1976 examined the hypothesis that holding
company banks exhibit different asset portfolios, revenue and cost
streams,and cap1tal structures t han independent banks.
e

·n

c

th

2

The study

difference in behavior t .oward risk between the holding

company affiliated bank and the independent, nonaffiliated bank
z

g a

o

i

ary least-squares regression equation to estimate

the i pact of e_plan tory variables on several performance ratios.
The

ost important res u l t of the experim,e ntation was that affiliated
ere shown to have lower equity-capit.al-to-total-asset ratios.

banks

o differences in net-earnings-to-asset ratios between the two bank
lasses

er

detected, implying that holding company banks exhibit

1

Lucille Mayne, "Supervisory Influence on Bank Capital," Journal
of Finan e 27 (June 1972). 637-51; San Peltzman, "Capital Investment
in Connnercial Banking and its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation,"
Journal of Poli ical Economy 28 (January-February 1970): 1-26.
2
John J. lingo, "Managerial Motives, Market Structure and The
Performance of Holding Company Banks," Economic Inquiry 4 (September
19 76) : 411-24.
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higher earnings-capital ratios than do independent banks.

It was also

found that affiliated banks hold greater proportions of risky assets
such as real estate loans and state-local issues.

The study suggested

that managers of affiliated banks tend to be more profit oriented than
independent bank managers.

The test included 250 independent and 134

ho d'ng company banks in 9 unit banking states.

The affiliated banks

had deposits ranging from $63 million down to $3 million and only
independent banks with deposits smaller than $70 million were chosen.
case study conducted by Hoffman focused on banks acquired by
to

lorida

ultibank holding companies between 1965 and 1973.

1

In

this ·nv stigation acquired banks were paired with similar sized
'ndepe dent banks located in the same banking market to isolate the

e fects of aff '1' ation on pe.rformance ..

Data for the anlaysis obtained

from a sam le of 13 paired affiliated and independent banks lead to
t e cone

'U

ion that neither holding company improved the capital

position of 'ts acquired banks .

Subsidiaries of the first holding

company h d a lower average capital account plus reserves per dollar
of assets and per dollar of deposit than paired independent banks,
both before acquisition and in 1974

but in absolute value the nega-

tive differential was much larger in 1974.

The second holding

company's subsidiaries had higher capital accounts plus reserves per
dollar of

ssets and per dollar of deposits than the paired

1 stuart G. Hoffman, The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation
on Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida Multibank Holding
Companies (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlan.ta, ~'lor king Paper Series,
January 1976).
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independents, on average, before acquisition; however, in 1974 these
ratios had declined slightly below those of the independent banks.

CHAPTER VIII
THE MODELS
The investigation examines the hypothesis that Florida banks
aff~l1ated

coverage
this

with bank holding companies operate with less capital
ceteris paribus, than do independent banks.

hypothes~s

o f risk i

Acceptance of

would imply that affiliated banks assume a higher level

banking, since bank equity capital is generally viewed as
cushion against operating losses.

a safet

~Iethodolog·

cal issues have been raised against early studies

concerning the impact of holding company acquisition on the performance

of acquir d banks.

1

These performance studies suffered from the fact

that univariate analysis was employed to analyze a multivariate problem.

The efore

the assumption of ceteris paribus was violated and the

results of these studies were at best problematic.
banks

Holding company

ere evaluated before and after acquisition by selectively pair-

ing observations, affiliates were compared with a central group of
unaffiliated banks, assuming that any differences in relative performance would be due to the effect of holding company affiliation.
Howev,e r, in pair ·ng analysis, factors other than affiliation are not

fully taken into consideration as determinants of an individual bankrs
1

Rodney D. Johnson and David R. einster, "An Analysis of Bank
Holding Company Acquisitions: Some !ethodological Issues," Journal of
Bank Research 4 (Spring 1973): 58.
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cap tal position.

For example, bank size and the level of earnings-

to-assets are important in determining capital levels, but these
explanatory variables are omitted in univariate analysis.
Our hypothesis is tested utilizing cross-sectional regression

analysis; a multivariate model is formulated to measure the effect of
several explanatory variables on capital adequacy ratios.

A

multi-

variate technique is utilized to insure that the effect of holding

company affiliation is isolated from other factors which influence
cap1tal adequacy .

Three capital-asset ratios are separately estimated

by o d nary least squares regression.

This study does not restrict

the assessment of capital accounts to one measure, because it was

ant·cipated that bet een the two bank classes any divergence in the
level of capital coverage might be more significant when measured by
one ratio as opposed to another .

s

That is, the particular ratio

ected for evaluation mdght influence conclusions concerning the

cap· tal adequacy of a particular bank and therefore, a particular

group of banks
The banks examined in this study were not randomly selected,
alternatively

informat~on

utilized in testing the hypothesis was

gathered from a cencus of the larger state chartered commercial banks.
A mi or ty of banks in the state control a significant proportion of
the total deposits held by state chartered institutions and for this
reason banks were not randomly select,e d.

It was felt that a study

which concentrated on a high proportion of bank resources would be
more mean· gful and provide greater insight in terms of the bank
holding company movement.

Institutions included in the census
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controlled approximately 50 percent of the total deposits held by state
chartered banks as of year end 1977.
Because changes in bank management practices probably occur
gradually after holding company acquisition, some period of time would
be necessary in order for a parent company to institute adjustments in
the balance sheet of a newly acquired bank.

A previous study found

that at least two years are required, following affiliation, before

s~gnificant differences in performance can be statistically observed. 1
The

fore, only affiliated banks which had been members of a holding

co pany for a minimum of four years were included in this investi.

ga 1.on.

2

It has been show that there exist significant differences in the
amount of cap·tal funds held by national, state Federal Reserve members,
and nonmember banks
constant

3

when the influence of other factors are held

Thus to reduce the influence on bank capital due to

diff,e r nt examining agencies, observations were restricted to state

chartered banks.
Assessment of capital adequacy is dependent, in part, upon those
balance sheet accounts which are included in the definition of bank
1

Rodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, "The Performance of
Bank Holding Company Acquisitions: A Multivariate Analysis," Journal
of Bus·ness 48 (April 1975): 211.
2
The ime period was chosen arbitrarily largely to insure
validity of the empirical tests.
3

Luc.ille S. Mayne, 'Supervisory Influence on Bank Capital,"
Journal of Finance 27 (June 972): 650.
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capital.

Utilizing the narrow definition, the first regression model

evaluates capital adequacy as the ratio of equity- capital-to-riskass ets·· that is, equity against those assets on which the bank 1s most

lik·ely to suffer losses.

The equity account includes:

common and

preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits and reserves for contingencies.

Risk assets are calculated by subtracting from total assets

the sum of cash and balances due from banks, U.S. Treasury securities,
federal

unds

~old,

and securities bought under resale agreements.

Two

dd.tional mod ls are constructed under the broader definition of bank
cap· al, equit) plus long term debt (i.e

The ratio of total-capital-to-risk-assets is examined in

debentures) .
t

subordinated notes and

e second model and in the third model total-capital-to-total-assets

is

he dependent variable.
Data was obta1ned from the Florida Division of Banking

December 31

1977

and consol'da

consol1dated reports of condition (State form 64)

d reports of income (Stat e form 73).

Regression equations are based on those formulated by Heggestad
and

.

~ngo.

1

Capital Adequacy

~del

(1)

ECRA = f(STA HCA, MEM, DDTD, DEP, CTA, NITA, SNDTC)
where,
ECRA

= equity

capital to risk assets; a measure of capital

adequacy.
1 Arnold

Heg 0 estad and John J. Mingo, ncapital Management by
Holding Compa y Banks," Journal of Bllsiness 48 (October 1975): 500.
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STA

- the sum of cash and due, plus U.S., treasury securities,

plus federal funds sold, as a percent of total assets.

=

RCA

holding eompany affiliation ,; a binary variable,
affiliates

MEM

=

1 ,, independents

=

0 ,.

- members of the Federal Reserve System; a binary variable,
embers =, 1, non-members

DDTD

=

0.

= demand deposits as a percent

of

t ~otal

deposits; a measure

of potential deposit volatility.
DEP

=

CT

= percentage change in total assets over the past 2 years;

total

d ~eposits;

a measure of relative bank size.

a measure of the bank's growth.

IT

- net income as a percent of total assets.

SNDTC - subordinated notes and debentures as a percent of total
cap~ tal.

Capital

d quacy

~del

{2)

TCRA = f(ST , HCA, MEM, DDTD

DEP, CTA, NIT'A)

here
TCRA

= total capital as a percent of risk assets; a measure of
capital adequacy .

Capital

dequacy

odel (3)

TCTA =-· f ( STA, RCA , MEM, DDTD, DEP , CTA, NITA)

where,
TCTA = total capital as a percent of total assets; a measure of

capital adequacy.
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Of the explanatory variables in the capital adequacy models, MEM
is included to measure any influence on capital by Federal Reserve
membership; STA is a measure of liquidity and portfolio risk; SNDTC is
included because subordinated debt can be considered in the total
capital account (debentures are expected to be inversely related to
equity capital; NITA is included since as Mingo has stated, the amount
'hich a bank can add to capital through retained earnings is dependent

upon the level of current earnings and the level of capital is highly
dependent on changes in capita1.

1

Total deposits are used as the

determinant of bank size and are exp,e cted to be positively related to
capital levels but negatively related to the capital-asset ratios.
Finally, the effect of holding company affiliation is incorporated into each multiple regression equation through the introduction of the
binary var1.able

HC _..

company affiliation

The binary variable determines how holding
a qualitat1.ve independent variable, is related to

the respective bank's capital ratio, t he quantitative dependent
var1.able.
The structure of Florida banking has undergone significant
change

in the past decade; the state has seen a greater increase in

banks and deposits than the Southeast's other states.

Because Florida

banks have recently experienced such a rapid rise in total deposits
and because earnings have been substantially depressed during the same
period, the state's banks have been plagued with the problem of
1 John J. Mingo, "Capital Management and Profitability of
Prospective Holding Company Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 10 (June 1975): 195.
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acquiring sufficient equity capital to keep pace with the growth of
their assets.

Since most of the Florida bank stocks have been selling

at 25% to 35% discounts from book value, these banks, like most other
commercial banks in the nation, have found it unfeasible to raise equity
capital in the last few years.
issuance of a
to meet

var~ety

1

Therefore, retained earnings and the

of debt instruments have been utilized in order

cap~tal needs.. 2

The increased issuance of debt capital has

heightened the level of financial risk in a number of Florida banks.
Debt capital, as noted in Chapter VI, cannot perform all the
functions conventionally assigned to bank capital.
proportion of debt in the capital structure of a

The greater the

bank~

the greater the

risk of cash insolvency and thus, the risk of bank failure.

A multi-

variate eq 'ation is employed to empirically examine the hypothesis that
holding company affiliation significantly influences the utilization

of deb

b

Florida banks .

Two debt leveraging models are formulated

to e amine . he usage of nondeposit debt funds by affiliated and
independent banks .

The first model examines strictly debt capital;

the rat·o of subordinated-debentures-to-total-capital is expressed as
a function of several explanatory variables.

In the second model the

usage of all nondeposit debt by the two bank classes is examined with
the dependent variable be·ng all maturity-nondeposit-debt as a percent
of total capital.

1Allen C. Ewing and Co., Florida Bank Holding Companies
(Jacksonville, Florida : Allen C. Ewing and Co., 1977), p. 18.
2

Ibid.
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1962
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Debt Leveraging Model (1)
SNDTC = f(HCA, MEM, ECRA, CTA, DEP, DDTD, IBTOI)
where,
SNDTC

=

subordinated notes and debentures as a percent of
total capital.

=

IBTOI

incomes before income taxes and securities gains or
losses as a percent of total operating income.

Debt Leveraging Model (2)

TDEC

=

f(HCA, MEM, ECRA, CTA, DEP, DDTD, IBTOI)

TDEC

= total

here,
nondeposit debt as a percent of equity capital.

Total nondeposit debt is the sum of federal funds purchased, s .e curities sold to repurchase, liabilities for
borrowed money, mortgage indebtness, acceptances executed
by or for an account of the bank and outstanding, sub-

ordinated notes and debentures.

Of the explanatory variables, all are the same as in the capital
adequacy models e cept IBTOI.

The IBTOI variable is utili.z ed in order

to quantify the debt servicing ability of commercial banks.

Because

the interest exp,e nse on time deposits is a high proportion of total
bank expenses and has priority over interest expense on long-term debt,
Fichthorn found that when measured by the times interest earned
multiple

1
.
commercial banks demonstrated limited debt servic1ng
a b'l'
1 1ty.

~illiam H. Fichthorn, "Do Bank Capital Notes Merit Investment
Stature," Financial Analysts Journal 23 (July-August 1967):

64.
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Fichthorn proposes that instead, the ratio of pre-tax operating profits
to gross. operating inc.ome constitutes a better measure of debt service

ability out of bank income.

1

CHAPTER IX
STATISTICAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
An ind~vidual bank's ability to withstand periods of unfavorable

economic. conditions is dependent, to a great degree, on the adequacy
of its capital .

The adequate level of bank capital is, however,

diff1cult to quantify and a subject of much debate.

Adequacy is a

function of various factor s many of which are outside the control of
management and this study does not attempt to determine that level
which can be termed "adequate".

The purpose of this study is to

determine the impact of the holding company movement on bank capital
positions.
The regression coefficients and t-ratios for the capital adequacy
models ar e presented ·n table x; the F ratios are significant at the
99 % level for all equations.

The change in total assets over the past

t¥lo years (CTA) and the level of bank earnings (NITA) are both significant in the determination of capital levels.

Growth in total assets

has a negative impact on the dependent capital ratios and, as expected,
the level of net income is positively related to capital adequacy.

The

regression equations show that validity of deposits, as measured by
DDTD

has a direct effect on the level of bank capital.
The empirical evidence off ered by this investigation indicat,e s

that there exists no statistically significant differences in the level
48
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of capital coverage, ceteris paribus, of holding company affiliated
banks vis-a-vis independent banks.

Therefore, it must be concluded

that holding companies have not reduced the safety of Florida's statebanking system through the under-capitalization of acquired banks.

And

further proliferation of holding companies does not appear to be a
thr,e at to the adequacy of capital accounts.

The usage of debt capital has important implications to the
stability of banking markets.

The solvency of a commercial bank is

dependent upon levels of equity capital when operating losses are
incurred and therefore, the ability of capital to absorb losses is
impaired as the proportion of capital comprised by debt increases.

The

employment of debt funds also entails fixed charges which cannot always
be

eferred

thus

the increased utilization of debt capital raises the

level of risk inherent in the respective bank.
I n order to determine the effect of affiliation on the utilization of debt

two multivariate models are examined; regression coeffi-

ciants for the affiliation variable (HCA) are negative implying that
affiliation is inversely related to the usage of debt; however, in
neither case was the RCA variable significant at the 90% level.
pectedly the coefficient of IBTOI, the variable designed to

Unex-

measur ~e

the debt servicing capacity of commercial banks, is also inversly
related to debt utilization.

These curious findings may first, only

be an indication that debt leveraging is being done within the holding
company itself..

It can be anticipated that funds secured by the parent,

through the issuance of debt instruments, would be passed on to the
individual bank in some other form.

Second, when additional capital is

50
TABLE X

Independents
are

Capital Adequacy Regressions
Dependent is

SNDTC

ECRA

TCRA

TCTA

.117

.009
(. 751)

-.146
(-2.191)*

STA

.115
(4.951)*

(5.003)*

CA

-. 453
(-.748)

-.402
(-.671)

-.139
(-.456)

MEM

-1.800
(-1.756)

-1.758
(-1.715)

-.455
(-.875)

DDTD

DEP

.025
(2.413)*

(2.464)*

-.001
(-.344)

-.001
(-. 305)

(-.592)

-.050

-.048
(-2.869)*

-.022
(-2.591)*

1.529

CTA

(-2.942)*
IT

-.001

(2.346)*

1.306
(3.945)*

.4098

.3703

.3934

F- rat·o
-

.017
(3.286)*

1.349
(1.892)*

ultiple r - square

t

.. 026

6.075

5.965

6.578

ratios in parenthesis

*indicates significant at 95% level

TABLE Y

Independents
are

RCA

MEM

Debt Leveraging
Regressions
Dependent is

SNDTC

TDEC

Liquidity
Regression

STA

-1.231
(-1.126)

3.411
(.831)

-1.208

-1. 714

8.748
(1.257)

8.708

(-.925)

(-.458)

(1.943)*
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TABLE Y - Continued
Debt Leveraging

Independents
are

Regressions

Dependent is

Liquidity
Regression

SNDTC

TDEC

STA

ECRA

-.398
(-2.179)*

.260
(.379)

2.142
(4.831)*

CTA

-.067
(-2.164)*

.261
(2.235)*

.156
(2.101)*

DEP

-.001
(-.752)

.006
(1.156)

DDTD

-.013
(-.680)

.127
(1.810)

IBTOI

-.121

-.721
(-2.967)*

(-1.877)

ITA

-.121
(-2.646)*

-5.185
(-1.735)

TA

.002
(.799)

u t"p e r

- square

.2317

.2829

.3653

F - r at · o

t

-

ratios in parenthesis

*indicates significant at 95% level
required the aff1liated bank may also benefit from the parent company's

innate capability to market equity and channel it to subsidiaries.
Because the liquidity variable (STA) is shown to be significant
and positively related to capital adequacy in the ECRA and TCRA models,
the STA variable can be considered a proxy for assessing the risk
posture of a particular bank.

Conservative management is expected to

maintain larger cash and near-cash balances, ceteris paribus, since

52
bank liquidity acts as a margin of safety in anticipation of unforeseen
demands for funds.
Based on the premise that STA is a proxy for management's risk
posture, a final model is constructed to test the impact of affiliation
on the liquidity variable.

Again a simple least squares regression

technique is utilized to test the impact of holding companies; coefficients and t

ratios are presented in table Y.

Affiliation (HCA) is

not a sign ficant explanatory variable; however, membership in the
Fede al Reserve system (MEM) is shown to have a positive effect on the
liquidity measure..

The STA regressian equation provides further

empirical evidence that affiliated banks are not assuming higher levels
of risk; that is, affiliated bank management is not any less risk
verse t _ a

the manag,e ment of independent banks.
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APPENDIX A

Double Leveraging
Assume a holding company and its subsidiary display the following
capital structure:
Bank Holdin

Bank Stoc

$20

Subsidiary Bank

$20

BHC Common

Assets

$100

Stock

$20 Equity
Capital
$80 Deposits

The regulatory agency feels the bank is in need of additional
capital and requests the bank to increment by $10.

If the holding

co pany uses double leveraging to comply with the request, the balance
sheets will ap ear as follows:
Subsidiary Bank

Bank Holdin
Bank Stock

$30

$20 BHC Common
Stock

Assets

$110

$10 Long Term Debt
The

$30 Equity
Capital
$80 Deposits

ank has increased the amount of its equity capital, but the

f nds were raised by leveraging the parent company.
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APPENDIX B
How Losses Are Charged Against Equity Capital
Equity capital represents a permanent source of funds available
to the bank which has been supplied by the owners.

Shareholders not

only participate in profits of the bank but they must also absorb
losses when they occur.
State Bank

Assets

Liabilities & Owner Equity

Cash

15

Deposits

Bonds

15

Common Stock

5

Reserves &. Retained Earnings

5

Subordinated Debt

1

Fi ed

ssets

5

65

Loans

89

100

100
Exampl

1.

Assume the uState Bank" incurs an operating loss of $2 million;
the bank will have an equal outflow of cash.

The loss is charged

against equity capital and the stockholders' claim against the bank
are reduced; the loss is deducted from reserves and retained earnings.
The balance sheet is adjusted as follows:
State Bank

Liabilities & Owner Equity

Assets

Cash

13

Deposits

Bonds

15

Common Stock

89
5
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State Bank
Assets
Fixed Assets

Liabilities & Owner Equity

5

65

Loans

Reserves & Retained Earnings

3

Subordinated Debt

1

98

98

Example 2.
Assume the "State Bank'' experiences an $8 million loan loss.

The loss is charged against the bank's loan loss reserves and retained
earnings.

Because the loan loss i s larger than the reserve and

etained earnings account, the remaining losses must be charged to
common stock· that is, reserves & retained earnings account are
reduced by $5 million and $3 million is deducted from the common stock
accoun .

The balance she,e t

no~v

appears as follows:

State Bank
Liabilities & Owner Equity

Assets

Cash

15

Deposits

Bonds

15

Common Stock

2

Reserves & Retained Earnings

0

Subordinated Debt

1

Fi ed Assets
Loans

5

57

92

89

92

In th's example the bank's equity capital was sufficient to
absorb losses and protect depositors, but if losses had exceeded $10
million the bank would have been forced to close.
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APPENDIX C
Topics For Further Investigation
This study has exposed some interesting areas which require
further research.

The source, uses and profitability of the capital

debenture needs to be analyzed from six differing perspectives or
objectives of interacting groups:

bank regulators, bank management,

d ,positors viewpoint, bank customers,
common shareholders.

bank competitors and bank

The objectives of each of these individual

groups influences the commercial bankrs objectives and as analysis
of po icies and procedures can be approached within this framework of
influences.

Useful financial information could be provided to the

banking c mmunity through the examination of debt capital under the
following criteria:
1)
)

prospective growth of commercial banks.
the stability of earnings.

3)

reliance on potential volitile sources of funds.

4)

quality of management.

5)

quality of assets.

F"nally, an investigation into the benefits derived through diversification of the holding company could provide important implications
in terms of the holding company movement (e.g., Has diversification
stabilized earnings and reduced risk within the commercial banking
system?)
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